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The Public Duty Doctrine and Municipal Liability
for Negligent Administration of Zoning Codes
Shelly K. Speir
[T]he drastic social and economic changes that have taken place since
the public duty doctrine's birth in the nineteenth century warrant that
it follow the doctrine of sovereign immunity into the 'dustheap of
history.'"
Imagine that you own a piece of property on which you would like
to build a small "Mom and Pop" grocery store. You are aware that
there are probably laws that regulate your lot, so you go to the city's
planning department to find out how your lot is zoned. The depart-
ment secretary assures you that your lot is zoned "commercial."
Elated, you apply for a building permit, which requires you to certify
that your store will comply with all of the applicable zoning and
building codes. You sign the application and a few weeks later receive
a building permit.
You proceed with construction. Periodically, your work is
inspected by a city official who tells you that everything appears to be
in compliance, and so you continue your work. On the day you finish
construction, you are served with notice that your neighbors are suing
you for violating the zoning code-it turns out that your lot is actually
zoned "single-family residential." You also receive a letter from the
city informing you that your building permit has been revoked. That
same day, another city inspector looks at the store and finds numerous
violations of the building code. Immensely frustrated, you decide to
sue the city because you feel that this whole mess is the city's fault.
Will your allegation of negligence as to the secretary's initial
statement find redress in the courts? Will the inspector's continued
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assurances of compliance give rise to a cause of action? Is the city's
issuance and subsequent revocation of the building permit actionable?
The answer to these questions may depend on whether or not
Washington courts continue to use what is termed the "public duty
doctrine" when analyzing zoning code cases.
This Comment first provides a brief background of the develop-
ment of the public duty doctrine. Part II discusses the two major
types of zoning cases: those involving negligent misstatements and
those involving negligent issuance of permits or inspections. The use
of the public duty doctrine in both types of cases is then analyzed
under relevant Washington case law. Part III argues for the abolition
of the public duty doctrine and Part IV concludes.
I. THE INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC
DUTY DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON
Prior to 1961, Washington municipalities enjoyed total immunity
from suit as political subdivisions of the state. Following a national
trend that began in New York, the Washington Legislature abolished
state sovereign immunity in 1961.2 In Kelso v. Tacoma,3 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court extended application of that statute to munici-
palities, thus establishing what this Comment refers to as the liability
rule: "The doctrine of governmental immunity [is] not preserved to
the municipal branches of government." 4 The legislature eventually
affirmed the court's interpretation, specifically abolishing governmental
immunity for municipalities.5
However, the Washington Supreme Court recognized that the
statutes abrogating immunity should "not render the state liable for
every harm that may flow from governmental action. ... [T]here
must be room for basic governmental policy decision and the imple-
mentation thereof, unhampered by the threat or fear of sovereign tort
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1995). See Scott J. Borth, Comment, Municipal Tort
Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537,
547 n.55 (1983).
3. 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964).
4. Id. at 918-19, 390 P.2d at 6.
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010(1) (1995) provides:
All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary
capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious
conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or
in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were
a private person or corporation.
(emphasis added).
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liability. "6 To protect governmental entities, the court carved out
a "discretionary act" exception to the liability rule in the seminal cases
of Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State7 and King v.
Seattle.8 Under the discretionary act exception, municipalities were
still immune from suit if their acts were discretionary (done at the
planning level) rather than ministerial (done at the operational level).'
If a municipality's acts were ministerial, then it was not immune from
suit, and a court could proceed with a traditional analysis of tort
liability.10
Under Evangelical and King, then, a court tests for municipal
liability in two steps. First, the court determines whether the
government's act was discretionary or ministerial. If discretionary, the
government is immune. If the act was ministerial, then the court
moves to the second step and determines liability using the traditional
tort law concepts of duty, foreseeability, breach, and causation. The
following is a diagram of the Evangelical/King test:
Evangelical/King
Step 1 Was the municipality's act dis-
cretionary or ministerial?
Step 2 Tort law analysis-duty, fore-
(If the act was ministerial) seeability, breach, causation.
Despite the clear precedent set by these early cases, this test was
altered dramatically in Campbell v. Bellevue." There, the plaintiff
successfully sued the City of Bellevue for negligent administration of
6. Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 253-54, 407
P.2d 440, 444 (1965).
7. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
8. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
9. Id. at 245, 525 P.2d at 232. The factors that must be considered to determine whether
an act is discretionary are: (1) Does the challenged act necessarily involve a basic governmental
policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change
the course or direction of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act require the exercise
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act? Id. If all the questions
can be answered affirmatively, the act is discretionary. Id.
10. See, e.g., King, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228.
11. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
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its electrical codes.' 2  In its discussion of the city's culpability, the
Campbell court quickly passed over both the liability rule and the
discretionary act exception, and omitted the tort law analysis. 3 The
court simply turned to New York case law, which relied on the public
duty doctrine, to resolve the liability issue."
When New York first abolished sovereign immunity, its courts
adopted the public duty doctrine as a method of protecting govern-
mental entities from otherwise unlimited liability." While the
purpose of limiting liability mirrored that of Washington's discretion-
ary act exception, the public duty doctrine followed a substantially
different line of reasoning. The basic premise of the doctrine is that
a duty to the public is a duty to no one,' 6 because governments
should not be punished for performing the duties that the legislature
has imposed on them. 7 Thus, the public duty doctrine focuses on
the relationship between the governmental entity and the individual
plaintiff as a member of the public, rather than on the characterization
of the allegedly tortious conduct as either discretionary or ministe-
rial.'
The Campbell court did not reveal why it chose to adopt the
public duty doctrine instead of following the Evangelical/King
precedent. 9 Campbell has never been overruled on that point, and,
although heavily criticized by judges and commentators, the public
duty doctrine has never been formally disavowed by Washington
courts. Subsequent case law has been grossly inconsistent, with the
Washington Supreme Court itself vacillating between the Evangelical/
King test and the public duty doctrine nearly on a case-by-case
12. Id. at 5, 530 P.2d at 236.
13. Id. at 10, 530 P.2d at 239.
14. Id.
15. See Borth, supra note 2, at 547 n.55. The doctrine itself originated in common law in
the nineteenth century and was first recognized by the Supreme Court in South v. Maryland, 59
U.S. 396, 402-03 (1855). Kelly Mahon Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure
to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 886 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d at 9, 530 P.2d at 238-39; Rogers v. Toppenish, 23
Wash. App. 554, 559, 596 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 (1979).
17. See Borth, supra note 2, at 539.
18. Mark McLean Myers, Comment, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal Tort
Liability in Washington, 59 WASH. L. REV. 533, 539 (1984).
19. The court merely stated: "We have no particular quarrel at this time with the general
premise on which the [New York] cases relied upon by the City stand. Campbell, 85 Wash.
2d at 9, 530 P.2d at 239.
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basis.2" This inconsistent application is vividly illustrated by the way
courts analyze cases involving negligent administration of zoning codes.
II. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IN ZONING CASES
There are two general types of zoning cases to which the public
duty doctrine has been applied: those dealing with negligent misstate-
ments of zoning codes and those dealing with negligent issuance of
permits or negligent inspections. The public duty doctrine has been
used to analyze municipal liability in both types, but because the
supposed justifications for applying the doctrine in each type is
different, they will be discussed separately.
A. Negligent Misstatements of Zoning Codes
Washington courts have dealt with negligent misstatements of
zoning codes three times, each time handling the liability issue
differently. Both Rogers v. Toppenish2' and Sundberg v. Evans22
combined the Evangelical/King test and the public duty doctrine,
resulting in hybrid analyses, while Mull v. Bellevue23 relied solely on
20. Cases fall into three general categories: those that use the Evangelical/King test, those
that use the public duty doctrine, and those that combine the two into a hybrid analysis. In the
first category, only King, decided one year before Campbell, dealt with zoning regulation. See
King, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (wrongful refusal to issue street use and building permits).
The other cases in that category involve everything from false arrest (Bender v. Seattle, 99 Wash.
2d 582, 664 P.2d 492 (1983)) to negligent design of a railroad crossing (Riley v. Burlington N.,
27 Wash. App. 11, 615 P.2d 516 (1980)).
Four cases that rely solely on the public duty doctrine deal with zoning, probably because
of the fact pattern in Campbell. See Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447
(1988) (negligent administration of zoning codes); Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d
455 (1988) (negligent issuance of special use and building permits); J & B Dev. Co. v. King
County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983), overruled by Taylor v. Stevens County, 111
Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988) and Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455
(1988) (injunction against suspension of a building permit); Mull v. Bellevue, 64 Wash. App. 245,
823 P.2d 1152 (1992) (negligent misrepresentation of building height regulations). Other cases
involve topics such as failure to respond to calls for help (Noakes v. Seattle, 77 Wash. App. 694,
895 P.2d 842 (1995), review denied, 127 Wash. 2d 1021, 904 P.2d 299 (1995)) and failure to
enforce Securities Act provisions (Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979)).
The hybrid analysis category includes three zoning cases. See Sundberg v. Evans, 78 Wash.
App. 616, 897 P.2d 1285 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1008, 910 P.2d 482 (1996)
(negligent misstatement of zoning ordinance); Radach v. Gunderson, 39 Wash. App. 392, 695
P.2d 128 (1985) (negligent enforcement of zoning code); Rogers, 23 Wash. App. 554, 596 P.2d
1096 (negligent representation of zoning classification). Other cases deal with topics ranging from
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress (Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.
2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983)) to negligent release of a drunk driver (Johnson v. State, 68 Wash.
App. 294, 841 P.2d 1254 (1992)).
21. 23 Wash. App. 554, 596 P.2d 1096 (1979).
22. 78 Wash. App. 616, 897 P.2d 1285 (1995).
23. 64 Wash. App. 245, 823 P.2d 1152 (1992).
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the public duty doctrine. Following a summary of the facts of these
cases, the policy considerations justifying the use of the public duty
doctrine in negligent misstatement cases will be evaluated, and then
each case will be reanalyzed using the Evangelical/King test.
1. Case Analyses
a. Rogers v. Toppenish
In Rogers, a buyer asked the city building inspector whether an
available parcel was zoned for apartment houses.24 The building
inspector said that it was, and the buyer purchased the parcel relying
on that representation; a building permit was duly issued.2" After
complaints from neighbors, the city manager informed the buyer that
the parcel was in fact zoned for single-family residences or duplexes
and therefore rescinded the building permit.26 After trying unsuccess-
fully to have the parcel rezoned, the buyer brought suit against the city
and the building inspector based on negligent representation.27
In its analysis, the court completed the first step of the Evangeli-
cal/King test by noting that, although sovereign immunity had been
abolished, there was an exception for discretionary acts.28 The court
found that the city exercised its discretion when it created a planning
commission and regulated land and building structures through
ordinances. Therefore, under the exception, the city was immune from
suit.29
The court next cited Campbell's use of the public duty doctrine,
but found it did not apply because the community's land-use plan
directly affected a protected class.3 Unfortunately, the court never
specified which class the land use plan purportedly protected. The
court bolstered its conclusion with a tort law analysis (the second step
of the Evangelical/King test) which included a public policy discussion
of municipal duty.31 Based on that discussion, the court found that
24. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 555, 596 P.2d at 1097.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 555-56, 596 P.2d at 1097.
27. Id. at at 557, 596 P.2d 1097-98.
28. Id. at 558, 596 P.2d at 1098. See supra note 9 for list of factors used in determining
if an act is discretionary.
29. Id. at 559, 596 P.2d at 1098.
30. Id. at 560, 596 P.2d at 1099. The "protected class" exception to the public duty
doctrine was first used in Halvorson v. Dahl and allows liability to be based on a municipal code
if that code, by its terms, evidences a dear intent to identify and protect a particular and
circumscribed class of persons. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192
(1978).
31. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 560, 596 P.2d at 1099.
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when a buyer inquires as to the zoning classification of a parcel, the
zoning administrator has a duty to answer accurately because the
response is ministerial, not discretionary.
3 2
The court finished its analysis by applying the "special relation-
ship" exception to the public duty doctrine, finding that a special
relationship existed between the buyer and the building inspector.33
Compared to the straightforward two-part Evangelical/King test, the
Rogers court's analysis appears more muddled:
Step 1
Step 2
















Does the public duty
doctrine apply?




Do any exceptions to
the public duty doc-
trine apply?
The result of the court's convoluted logic was that the municipality
owed a duty to the buyer to answer questions accurately, and when
this duty was breached both the city and the building inspector could
be held liable.34
32. Id. See discussion supra note 9.
33. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 561, 596 P.2d at 1100. The special relationship exception
was applied in Campbell and allows for municipal liability where a relationship exists or has
developed between an injured plaintiff and agents of the municipality, creating a duty to perform
a mandated act for the benefit of particular persons or class of persons. Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d
at 9-10, 530 P.2d at 239. The current test is found in Taylor: There is a special relationship
where (1) there is privity or direct contact between the public official and the plaintiff; (2) the
public official gives express assurances; and (3) the plaintiff justifiably relies on those assurances.
Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 166, 759 P.2d at 451.
34. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 561, 596 P.2d at 1100.
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b. Sundberg v. Evans
In Sundberg, a couple asked a secretary in the county planning
department whether a piece of property they wanted to buy was zoned
commercial." While the zoning map gave a recreational designation,
the comprehensive plat indicated that the property was commercial.36
The couple claimed that the secretary assured them that the lots were
zoned commercial and that they relied on this information when they
purchased the property.37 When the Board of Adjustment denied
approval of the couple's building site plan due to noncompliance with
zoning regulations, the couple sued the secretary and the county on
negligent representation grounds.
38
Like Rogers, the Sundberg court incorporated the public duty
doctrine into its analysis. It asked first whether the county had a duty.
To answer the question, the court turned to Rogers to find that the
county did have a duty to provide accurate information if the couple
asked and if the secretary chose to answer.39 Second, the court went
to the first step of the Evangelical/King test and found that the
secretary's acts were ministerial, and therefore not protected from
liability.40 Finally, on finding the acts were ministerial, the court
queried whether they were in response to a public or individual
duty.4  For the last question, the court noted that the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine might apply, but the
court remanded the case on this issue due to the insufficient record
before it.4" On remand, the trial court was to determine whether the
secretary had given express assurances or merely opinions, and whether
the couple could reasonably have relied on those representations.43
In the end, the Sundberg case nearly turned the Evangelical/King test
on its head:
35. 78 Wash. App. at 618, 897 P.2d at 1286.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 619, 897 P.2d at 1286.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 622, 897 P.2d at 1288. The court's analysis leaves open the question of whether
a municipality has a duty to answer direct zoning inquiries, or whether a plaintiff who makes an
inquiry may rely on the municipality's "non-answer." But cf. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 560, 596
P.2d at 1099 (administrator has a duty to answer because the response is ministerial).
40. Sundberg, 78 Wash. App. at 622-23, 897 P.2d at 1288. See supra note 9 for list of
factors courts should consider.
41. Id. at 621, 897 P.2d at 1287.





Was there a municipal
duty to give correct
information?
Step 1 Was the municipali- Was the municipali-
ty's act discretionary ty's act discretionary
or ministerial? or mininsterial?
(If ministerial) Do any
exceptions to the
public duty doctrine
apply?..... ................... ................... ......................................... ................. . ..........................................
Step 2 Tort law analysis-
(If the act was duty, foreseeability,
ministerial) breach, causation
c. Mull v. Bellevue
A developer in Mull submitted to the City of Bellevue plans for
the construction of three office buildings." Despite having exceeded
the maximum allowable height on one of the buildings, the developer
was issued a permit and began construction.45 Later, after changing
the plans to allow for a deeper basement and added height, the
developer again requested and again was granted permission to
continue construction.46 During this process he received personal
assurances from an employee at the city's Design and Development
Department that the change in building height was not significant and
would not require additional review.47 Upon inspection, however,
city officials determined that the building would be too tall and issued
a stop work order.4" The developer filed a negligence claim against
the city.49
44. Mull, 64 Wash. App. at 246, 823 P.2d at 1153.
45. Id. at 247-48, 823 P.2d at 1154.
46. Id. at 249-50, 823 P.2d at 1155.
47. Id. at 248, 823 P.2d at 1154.
48. Id. at 250, 823 P.2d at 1155.
49. Id.
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Unlike Rogers and Sundberg, the Mull court used only the public
duty doctrine to analyze liability.50 Because the city did not owe the
developer a duty, the court had no need for further analysis. Although
the court tiptoed around a discussion of tort principles, nowhere in its
opinion did it address the Evangelical/King test.
Evangelical/King Mull
Step 1 Was the municipali-
ty's act discretionary
or ministerial?
Step 2 Tort law analysis-





2. Public Policy Analysis
As noted by the Rogers and Mull courts, the general policy
supporting use of the public duty doctrine in negligent misstatement
cases is that municipalities should not be discouraged from enacting
legislation (like zoning laws) for the public welfare." But this
argument assumes that without the public duty doctrine municipalities
would lack protection from the numerous lawsuits that would
inevitably arise. Not only is this assumption exaggerated,52 it also
completely ignores the discretionary act exception.
The purpose of the discretionary act exception is two-fold: First,
it protects municipalities from liability at the policy implementation
level,53 and second, it prevents taxes raised for the public good from
being diverted to pay for private losses.54
50. Id. at 251, 823 P.2d at 1155-56.
51. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 559, 596 P.2d at 1099; Mull, 64 Wash. App. at 256, 823 P.2d
at 1158.
52. See Myers, supra note 18, at 541.
53. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 254, 407 P.2d at 444.
54. See Borth, supra note 2, at 539.
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Technically, the discretionary act exception is distinguishable from
the public duty doctrine because it holds municipalities immune even
if they breach an existing duty. In contrast, the public duty doctrine
prevents liability because no duty is held to exist. In spite of this
theoretical difference, however, the result is the same: Governments
can govern without fear of tort liability. Because the Evangelical/King
test by itself adequately protects municipalities' governmental and
financial interests, the public duty doctrine is redundant."5
The Mull court listed three specific policy arguments in support
of using the public duty doctrine in negligent misstatement cases. The
first asserted policy is that zoning codes are designed to protect public
health and safety, not to protect individuals from economic loss caused
by public officials.6 This contention is invalid for two reasons.
First, because the act of passing zoning legislation would be considered
discretionary, 7 legislators would already be immune from suit under
Evangelical and King. As for administrators, they could be liable for
negligent misstatements under both the Evangelical/King test and the
public duty doctrine, either because the act is ministerial" or because
the special relationship exception 9 could apply. Thus, municipalities
receive no greater protection from liability under the public duty
doctrine than they do under the Evangelical/King test.
Additionally, the policy argument is invalid because the idea that
a duty to the public is a duty to no one is illogical.6" Logic would in
fact suggest that a duty to the public is a duty to everyone. Since
municipalities are statutorily liable to the same extent as private
individuals,61 it follows that municipalities should have a duty to give
correct information when answering direct zoning questions. It is more
congruent with legislative intent that municipalities be held to the same
reasonable care standard62 as the individuals they serve.
This first policy consideration is most appropriately discussed in
the tort analysis phase of the Evangelical/King test. Unfortunately, the
public duty doctrine does not permit any discussion of foreseeability.
The only way a plaintiff can successfully hold a municipality liable for
its negligent misstatements under the public duty doctrine is by
55. See Myers, supra note 18, at 537.
56. Mull, 64 Wash. App. at 255, 823 P.2d at 1158.
57. See supra note 8.
58. Id. See also Sundberg, 78 Wash. App. at 622, 897 P.2d at 1288.
59. See discussion supra note 33.
60. See Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 559 n.4, 596 P.2d at 1099 n.4.
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010.
62. See Myers, supra note 18, at 539.
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satisfying the requirements of the special relationship exception.63
The public duty doctrine is therefore inappropriate for negligent
misstatement cases because it ignores legislative intent and makes relief
dependent on the relationship between the plaintiff and the munici-
pality, that is, on the nature of the duty, rather than satisfaction of the
other traditional tort law principles such as foreseeability and causation.
The second of Mull's specific policy considerations favoring the
use of the public duty doctrine in negligent misstatement cases
maintains that it is unreasonable to place the burden of ensuring
compliance with zoning codes on municipalities.64 Budgetary and
personnel constraints would supposedly present too great a cost with
too little public benefit.6"
But this argument overlooks the difference between negligent
permit issuance and inspection cases and negligent misstatement cases.
In negligent misstatement cases, the cost of ensuring compliance is
merely prevention of employee misstatements66 so that later, more
expensive corrective measures (e.g., litigation or demolition of a
building) are not necessary. Municipalities are in the best position to
bear this risk because they have direct control over the behavior of
their employees. Municipalities can also purchase liability insurance
or impose limits on damage awards.67 The benefits of preventing
employee misstatements include increased reliability of municipal
employees, consistent application of zoning laws, greater predictability
for developers who must comply with zoning codes, and increased
compliance of developers. Thus, because it permits municipalities to
operate inefficiently, the use of the public duty doctrine in negligent
misstatement cases is not supported by a balancing of costs and
benefits to the municipality.
As for the municipality vis-a-vis the public, if the public shares
the benefit of a municipal act, then the public should share the cost of
that act.6" If the public benefits by having its zoning questions
answered by municipal employees, then the public should pay for that
service by allowing municipalities to reimburse the victims of their
63. See discussion supra note 33.
64. Mull, 64 Wash. App. at 255, 823 P.2d at 1158.
65. Id.
66. In practical terms, effective prevention could be as simple as limiting the types of
municipal employees that could answer citizen inquiries, or as extensive as employee training
programs.
67. See Myers, supra note 18, at 541.
68. Kelso, 63 Wash. 2d at 914-15, 390 P.2d at 4.
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negligent zoning misstatements,69 so that the victims do not bear the
entire cost of the service. Thus, the public duty doctrine should not
be employed in negligent misstatement cases because the costs of
employee misstatements are thereby shifted from the general public to
the victims of municipal negligence.
Mull's third policy argument in support of the public duty
doctrine is that holding municipalities liable in negligent misstatement
cases would remove citizens' incentive to conduct their own review of
the zoning code to ensure compliance.7" However, this argument
ignores the fact that citizens must still comply with zoning regulations
to obtain permits and to pass inspections.7 If municipalities were
liable for negligent misstatements, a citizen's desire to obtain permit
and inspection approval would still provide an incentive to conduct
reviews of the zoning code. Municipal liability may even increase this
incentive because citizens would be assured that inquiries they
presented during their review would be answered with reasonable
accuracy, thus raising their chances of gaining permit or inspection
approval. Additionally, because Washington is a comparative
negligence state, citizens could risk losing any chance of recovering
damages if they did not act reasonably in their attempts to comply
with local zoning codes. Dispensing with the public duty doctrine
would not discourage citizens from reviewing zoning codes. It would
only provide an incentive for municipalities to give correct responses
to citizen inquiries.
3. Traditional Tort Law Analysis
Former Justice Utter suggested that a traditional tort law analysis
should replace the public duty doctrine.72 The main difference
between the two analyses lies in the way they define duty. Traditional
tort law imposes a duty upon everyone to use reasonable care when an
action creates a foreseeable risk of harm to some person or class of
persons; under the public duty doctrine, on the other hand, duty arises
through the relationship between the municipality and the plaintiff.73
69. Id.
70. Mull, 64 Wash. App. at 255-56, 823 P.2d at 1158. But the Mull court itself
acknowledged that when a municipality negligently supplies erroneous information on which a
landowner reasonably relie% the municipality may be held liable. Id. at n.4.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
72. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 172-73, 759 P.2d at 454 (Utter, J., concurring); Chambers-
Castanes, 100 Wash. 2d at 290, 669 P.2d at 460 (Utter, J., concurring).
73. Myers, supra note 18, at 539.
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Had the Rogers, Sundberg, and Mull courts substituted traditional
tort law principles for the public duty doctrine, their analyses would
have been clearer and more consistent. Their use of the public duty
doctrine only clouded the issues and was neither necessary nor helpful
to the resolution of the cases.
In Rogers, the court was correct when it began with the liability
rule and the discretionary act exception. This was consistent with both
the statutes and the Evangelical/King test.74 However, the court
stretched the liability rule too far when it considered the city's acts of
creating a planning commission and regulating land and building
structures. Instead, the Rogers court should have recognized that the
inspector specifically told the buyer that the property was zoned for
apartment houses. Since the error occurred at the operational level, it
was ministerial and the city would not have been immune from suit.
The court could then have proceeded to the second step of the
Evangelical/King test and examined the duty issue without ever
mentioning the public duty doctrine.
In its tort law analysis, the court should have limited the city's
duty with a discussion of foreseeability and public policy consider-
ations. Because the buyer made a direct inquiry of the city building
inspector7" (who should be required to provide correct information),
the court would probably have found that the city owed the buyer a
duty to answer his question correctly. After finding a duty, the court
should then have looked for a breach. Since the inspector's statements
were incorrect, this element would probably have been satisfied. The
court's next step would have been to determine whether the city's
breach was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the harm to the
buyer. Because the buyer would probably not have purchased the
property had he known its true zoning designation, and because there
were no superseding causes to break the chain of causation, the city's
breach probably satisfied both aspects of causation. The court could
then have concluded that the municipality was liable. By following the
Evangelical/King test, it could have produced a fair result without
introducing extraneous law.
Unlike Rogers, the Sundberg court erred in asking a duty question
at the outset of its analysis. Instead, it should have initially used the
liability rule and the discretionary act exception to determine whether
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE 4.96.010 (1995); Kelso,
63 Wash. 2d at 918-19, 390 P.2d at 6; Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 253-55, 407 P.2d at 444-45;
King, 84 Wash. 2d at 245, 525 P.2d at 232; Borth, supra note 2, at 547 n.55.
75. See Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 560, 596 P.2d at 1099.
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the county was immune to suit, as required by the Evangelical/King
test. Since the negligent act in Sundberg occurred at the operational
level, as in Mull, the secretary's response to the couple's question was
ministerial and the county should not have been immune.
Under the second step of the Evangelical/King test, the court
should have turned to Rogers and public policy to determine if the
county owed the couple a duty. Due to the similar fact pattern in
Rogers, the court should have found that a duty was owed. Continuing
with a traditional tort law analysis, the court should have then decided
whether the duty was breached. Based on the insufficient record
before it, the court probably would not have been able to determine as
a matter of law whether the secretary's statements were incorrect. On
remand to the lower court, however, such a determination could be
made and the court could proceed with the remaining question of
causation. The court could have made its decision without ever
mentioning the public duty doctrine or breaking from the Evangelical
or King precedent.
The Mull opinion should also have begun like Rogers, using the
liability rule and the discretionary act exception to determine if the city
was immune. Since the city's negligence occurred at the operational
level when it advised the developer that the changes in building height
were insignificant, its acts were ministerial and it would not have been
immune to suit.
Again, the court should then have moved to a traditional tort law
analysis under the second step of the Evangelical/King test. Had the
court looked for a duty, under Rogers it would have found that the city
employee had a duty to give correct information. The court should
then have looked for a breach of duty, which it could have found since
the employee gave incorrect information. Since the developer asked the
employee direct questions and was given incorrect answers upon which
he relied, the city's breach was probably the cause in fact of the
developer's injury.
In considering whether the city's breach was the proximate cause
of the injury, however, the court may have found superseding causes
that would have broken the chain of liability. For example, the
developer never specifically asked the city what the maximum
allowable building height was, nor did he ever attempt to find the
answer himself. The revised plans he submitted to the city also did
not show the actual height of the building, so that it would have been
impossible for the city independently to discover his noncompliance
with the zoning code. The court might have found that the devel-
oper's contributory negligence excused the city from liability. This
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result would have been fair, efficient, and consistent with traditional
tort law principles.
B. Negligent Issuance of Building Permits and Negligent Inspections
The second type of zoning case which the use of the public duty
doctrine has muddled involves negligent permit issuance or inspection.
Unfortunately, Washington courts have applied the Evangelical/King
test just as inconsistently here as in the negligent misstatement cases.
Within this type of case, King v. Seattle76 helped establish the
Evangelical/King test, while Taylor v. Stevens County77 and Meaney
v. Dodd78 relied on the public duty doctrine.
As in previous section, a summary of the facts of these cases will
be followed by a discussion of public policy and the substitution of a
tort law analysis.
1. Case Analyses
a. King v. Seattle
In King, a couple purchased lots in Seattle and with plans to
construct an office building.79 In order to obtain a building permit,
the couple was first required to secure a street use permit from the
city.s° The city denied the couple's street use application because it
believed the permit might conflict with a pending local improvement
district plan."1 Because the street use permit had been denied, the
couple's building permit was also denied. 2  Eventually, due to
unrelated complications, the couple abandoned the project, ceased
making payments on the lots, and quitclaimed their interest in the
property to the vendor.83 The couple sued the city for the resulting
loss of profit."4
The court began its analysis with the liability rule, then moved
into a discussion of the discretionary act exception. The court found
that because the city had not made a "policy decision" that included
a conscious balancing of risks and advantages when it denied the
76. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
77. 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
78. 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).




83. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 242, 525 P.2d at 230.
84. Id. at 242, 525 P.2d at 230-31.
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permits, the city was not immune from suit. 5 The court proceeded
to a tort law analysis, beginning with a discussion of foreseeability.8 6
Because the risk of economic loss due to delay, increased prices,
accumulated interest on borrowed money, and other factors were
foreseeable, the court found that the city owed the couple a duty to act
reasonably.17  Since the city did not reasonably protect the couple
from economic harm, the city breached its duty."8 Although the
court found that the city's acts were the cause in fact of the couple's
injury, the city's acts were not the proximate cause because the couple
did not mitigate their damages.8 9 The city was therefore not liable.90
b. Taylor v. Stevens County
In Taylor, a couple purchased a home that had been built before
obtaining a building permit.9 Before the sale, the sellers applied for
a permit; although the house was still unfinished, the county building
inspector noted that the "structure appeared to be of adequate
construction" and the county approved the permit.92  Later, the
buyers discovered construction defects and had the house reinspect-
ed.93  The inspector found numerous violations of the building
code.94  The couple sued the county for negligent issuance of a
building permit and negligent inspection.95
The Taylor court ignored the Evangelical/King test altogether and
immediately turned to the public duty doctrine to evaluate the couple's
claim. The court tried to characterize its analysis in terms of tort law
concepts, calling its discussion of the public duty doctrine a "basic
principle of negligence law."'96 However, instead of doing an actual
assessment of duty, the court cited the protected class exception and
found that the county's building codes were not intended to protect a
85. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 246-47, 525 P.2d at 233. The court did not make a specific
finding as to whether the act of denying a building or street use permit was discretionary because
a lower court had ruled that the city's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 247, 525 P.2d
at 233.
86. Id. at 248, 525 P.2d at 234.
87. Id. at 249, 525 P.2d at 234.
88. Id.
89. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 249. 525 P.2d at 234.
90. Id. at 250, 525 P.2d at 235.
91. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 161, 759 P.2d at 448.
92. Id. at 161, 759 P.2d at 449.
93. Id. at 161-62, 759 P.2d at 449.
94. Id. at 162, 759 P.2d at 449.
95. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 162, 759 P.2d at 449.
96. Id. at 163, 759 P.2d at 449.
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particular class.97 The court then examined the requirements of the
special relationship exception, but eventually based its holding on
public policy.9" The court opined that the issuance of a building
permit was not an "official action" and did not imply that the plans
submitted in an application complied with the relevant regulations.99
The court found that the duty to ensure compliance should rest with
the applicant, so that the county was not required to check the seller's
building permit or do a reasonable building inspection. 00 The
court's analysis looked nothing like the Evangelical/King test:
Evangelical/King Taylor
Step 1 Was the municipali-
ty's act discretionary
or ministerial?
Step 2 Tort law analysis-
(If the act was duty, foreseeabiity,
ministerial) breach, causation
Does an exception to
the public duty doc-
trine apply?
..o.0...0 .0..0. ........ , ., .,. ,,.. ..................................................  ..................... ...................
Does public policy
support the finding of
"a duty?
The result was that the county was not liable to the couple.'0 '
97. Id. at 164-66, 759 P.2d at 450-51. See supra note 30. One wonders how a statute can
possibly protect the public health, safety, and welfare when the county does not have a duty to
enforce the statute for the benefit of individuals. See Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 164, 759 P.2d at
450.
98. Id. at 166-71, 759 P.2d at 451-53. See discussion supra note 33. The court thereby
overruled J & B Development Co. on this point. SeeJ & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 306-07,
669 P.2d at 473.
99. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 167, 759 P.2d at 451-52.
100. Id. at 168-69, 759 P.2d at 452-53.
101. Id. at 172, 759 P.2d at 454.
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c. Meaney v. Dodd
In Meaney, Dodd applied for a special use permit to operate a
sawmill on his property. 2 During the application process, he asked
county employees for assistance in assuring his proposal complied with
county regulations, but did not make any specific inquiries regarding
noise level regulations.0 3 The county zoning administrator checked
the application against the zoning regulations and visited Dodd's
property, but because the sawmill had not yet been built, the adminis-
trator could not determine how much noise it would produce."°
Dodd's application for a special use permit was approved, and he
then obtained a building permit to construct the sawmill.' During
the next year and a half, neighbors complained that the sawmill
exceeded the noise level allowed in the zoning code.1"6 Eventually,
the noise level was measured and Dodd was ordered to cease operation
until he complied with the level set in the code.'0 7 However, because
of the location and design of the sawmill, Dodd was unable to comply,
and his special use permit was revoked.'08 Dodd sued the county for
negligent misrepresentation and negligent issuance of special use and
building permits."°'
Like the Taylor court, the Meaney court did not mention the
Evangelical/King test. Instead, it based its decision solely on the
public duty doctrine.' The court noted that there were several
exceptions to the doctrine, but found that the special relationship
exception was the only one applicable."' Based on Taylor's public
policy analysis and the fact that Dodd did not make any direct
inquiries regarding noise levels, the court decided that no special
relationship was established and that the county had no duty to give
correct information. 112 Furthermore, because Dodd never provided
the anticipated noise level in his application, and because a government
should be able to rely on the statements of a permit applicant, again no
102. Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 175, 759 P.2d at 456.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 176, 759 P.2d at 456.
105. Id.
106. Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 176, 759 P.2d at 456.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 176-77, 759 P.2d at 456.
109. Id. at 177, 759 P.2d at 456.
110. Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 178, 759 P.2d at 457.
111. Id. at 178-79, 759 P.2d at 457.
112. Id. at 180-81, 759 P.2d at 458-59. The court thereby overruled J & B Development
Co. on these two points. SeeJ & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 305, 305-08, 669 P.2d at 472-73.
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special relationship was established and the county had no duty to
check Dodd's application for compliance with the zoning code."
3
The court's analysis was exactly the same as Taylor:
Evangelical/King Meaney
Step 1 Was the municipali-
ty's act discretionary
or ministerial?
Step 2 Tort law analysis-
(If the act was duty, foreseeability,
ministerial) breach, causation
Does an exception to
the public duty doc-
trine apply?.............. .. ...............................
Do public policy
support the finding of
a duty?
The county was therefore not liable on either of Dodd's claims.'
2. Public Policy Analysis
The central reason that the public duty doctrine is used in
negligent permit issuance and inspection cases is to shift the burden of
zoning code compliance to the permit applicant." 5 Under this
theory, the duty to comply properly rests with the applicant not only
because of budgetary and personnel constraints, but also because the
applicant is in a better position to prevent any harm to foreseeable
plaintiffs." 6  This argument is also consistent with Washington's
vested rights doctrine, which protects a builder's right to develop land
only if the builder's permit is in full compliance with zoning and
113. Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 180-81, 759 P.2d at 458-59.
114. Id. at 181, 759 P.2d at 459.
115. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 168, 759 P.2d at 452; Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 179, 759
P.2d at 458.
116. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 169, 759 P.2d at 452. See also Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 180,
759 P.2d at 458.
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building codes in effect at the time the permit application is submit-
ted.' 1
7
However, the idea of shifting the burden of compliance to
applicants can only be considered under the Evangelical/King test."'
Under Evangelical and King, a court is free to consider the effects of
public policy on duty and the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiffs.
Factors such as budgetary and personnel constraints and the ease of
preventing harm are easily incorporated into such discussions.
However, a technical application of the public duty doctrine, with its
strict emphasis on the relationship of the plaintiff to the municipali-
ty,"9 does not allow public policy to affect the determination of
liability.
It may be pointed out that Rogers and Taylor, both of which used
the public duty doctrine, also relied heavily on policy considerations.
Rogers looked at the policy behind an administrator's duty to answer
direct inquiries correctly, 20 while Taylor examined the policy behind
holding permit applicants responsible for compliance with zoning
codes.' But the problem in those cases was not the courts' consid-
eration of policy; it was the fact that both courts considered policy
under the guise of the public duty doctrine. Had the courts applied
the Evangelical/King test, they would have been able to discuss public
policy as part of a traditional tort law analysis. That the courts did not
explicitly follow the Evangelical/King precedent only confused their
analyses. Because the public duty doctrine is not as policy sensitive as
tort analysis, it should not be used to decide negligent permit
issuance/inspection cases that typically have depended on public policy
for resolution.
3. Traditional Tort Law Analysis
The King case helped establish the proper analysis for negligent
permit issuance or inspection cases. The opinion began with a
discussion of the liability rule and the discretionary act exception,
followed by a traditional tort law analysis including foreseeability, duty,
breach, and causation. As it stands, the opinion is a model of how the
Evangelical/King test should be applied. In the remainder of this
117. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 169, 759 P.2d at 452-53.
118. See Jenifer Kay Marcus, Comment, Washington's Special Relationship Exception to the
Public Duty Doctrine, 64 WASH. L. REV. 401, 415 (1989).
119. See discussion supra note 33.
120. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 560, 596 P.2d at 1099.
121. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 167-71, 759 P.2d at 451-54.
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section, the Taylor and Meaney cases are re-analyzed under the
precedent set by King.
The Taylor opinion should have started with the liability rule and
the discretionary act exception. Because neither the issuance of a
building permit nor inspection involves the implementation of
governmental policy,122 the court should have found the county's
actions ministerial and not immune. The court should then have done
a tort law analysis under the second step of the Evangelical/King test,
starting with a discussion of duty. Based on the court's discussion of
public policy, it probably would have found that the county did not
owe the couple a duty to check the sellers' permit application or to do
a reasonable inspection. Without a duty, there could be no liability,
and the court could have ended its discussion. The public duty
doctrine only clouded the analysis.
For the claim of negligent representation, the Meaney opinion
should have similarly started with the liability rule and the discretion-
ary act exception. Because answering a zoning question is ministerial
and does not involve policy implementation,123 the court probably
would have found that the county was not immune from suit. The
court should have then performed the second step of the Evangelical!
King test, a tort law analysis. In its consideration of whether the
county had a duty to answer Dodd's questions, the court should have
looked back at Rogers and the public policy behind holding municipali-
ties liable for negligent misstatements. Because Dodd did not make a
direct inquiry regarding noise level regulations, the court probably
would have found that the county had no duty to answer his questions
correctly.
As for the claim of negligent issuance of special use and building
permits, the Meaney court would probably have found that the county
was not immune because permit issuance does not involve policy
determination, and is thereby ministerial.'24 Moving into the tort
law analysis as required by Evangelical/King, the court should have
considered the public policies behind holding a municipality liable for
issuing invalid permits. Because of the municipal budgetary and
personnel constraints, the right of the municipality to rely on an
applicant's statements, and the superior ability of applicants to prevent
foreseeable harm, the court would probably have found that the county
122. See discussion supra note 9.
123. Rogers, 23 Wash. App. at 560, 596 P.2d at 1099; Sundberg, 78 Wash. App. at 622, 897
P.2d at 1288.
124. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 167, 759 P.2d at 451-52. See discussion supra note 9.
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had no duty to check Dodd's permits for compliance with the zoning
regulations. The court could have ended its analysis at that point.
Use of the Evangelical/King test would have allowed the Meaney court
to analyze both of Dodd's claims consistently and give full consider-
ation to public policy. Use of the public duty doctrine again only
confused the opinion.
III. ABOLITION OF THE PUBLIC DuTY DOCTRINE
A small but growing minority of jurisdictions have explicitly
abolished the public duty doctrine. 2 s Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have all rejected the
doctrine in favor of traditional tort law analyses.126 In those states,
the public duty doctrine is often seen as another form of sovereign
immunity which has already been statutorily abolished.127 Many
states that still adhere to the public duty doctrine only apply it in
statutorily prescribed situations, such as police assistance cases.
Several arguments support the abolition of the public duty
doctrine in Washington. First, the doctrine has been weakened
through the constant creation of exceptions. 2' There is no reason to
continue to invoke a rule that has been "swallowed." Second, though
unwilling to admit it, the Washington Supreme Court has applied tort
law analyses to cases that it insisted rest on exceptions to the public
duty doctrine.'29 Explicit use of tort law principles to resolve these
cases would prevent any further confusion regarding municipal duty.
Finally, according to former Justice Utter, the public duty doctrine is
a limited form of sovereign immunity which imposes a presumption
against the existence of a duty and contradicts the Washington Law
that expressly provides that municipalities are to be held liable to the
125. McMillan, supra note 1, at 520.
126. Id.; Amy Beth Novit, Comment, Tort Law--Abrogating the Massachusetts Public Duty
Rule-Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 986 (1993); Maple v. Omaha, 384
N.W.2d 254, 256 (Neb. 1986) (no requirement that the negligent act complained of be performed
by such municipal employee in furtherance of a private duty owed to the claimant as opposed to
a duty owed the daimant and public generally); Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387,
1388 (N.H. 1993) ("the rule is no longer viable in this State").
127. See McMillan, supra note 1, at 520.
128. Julie A. Lawry, Comment, Municipal Liability, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 727, 728 (1983-84).
Note that in the first Washington case which used the doctrine, Campbell, the court applied the
special relationship exception to find liability. Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d at 10, 530 P.2d at 239.
The public duty doctrine has never been applied without any of its exceptions in a Washington
zoning case.
129. See, e.g., Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234.
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same extent as private individuals. 130  The public duty doctrine
should be abandoned because it flouts legislative intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Before the public duty doctrine was introduced in Washington,
courts determined municipal liability by using the two-part Evange-
lical/King test. The public duty doctrine was not supported by case
law and legislation of the 1960s, and its introduction in Campbell was
a jurisprudential anomaly. Today, the doctrine unnecessarily
complicates what once was, and could be again, a straightforward
analysis. The public duty doctrine is inappropriate for zoning cases
because it does not provide any additional protection for municipalities,
it ignores legislative intent, it makes relief dependent on the relation-
ship of the plaintiff to the municipality, it permits municipalities to
operate inefficiently, and it allocates the burden of municipal negli-
gence solely to the victims. The doctrine should be abolished and
Washington courts should return to the soundness and simplicity of
the Evangelical/King test to determine municipal liability for negligent
administration of zoning codes.
130. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash. 2d at 291, 669 P.2d at 461.
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